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Comments
The Performance Exemption Under Section 110(5):
Time for a Change
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976, Congress enacted the new Copyright Act' in order to
modernize the guidelines controlling a field of law which is contin-
ually subject to technological changes and advances. The protec-
tions afforded the copyright owner are vast. However, exceptions
and limitations are imposed in order to satisfy the dual tension
which is inherently present in copyright law: encouraging and re-
warding an author's creative labor while promoting broad public
availability of the composing artist's works."
Under the 1976 Act, when one "performs" a copyrighted work,
one may be subject to an infringement action if a license is not
first obtained.3 "To 'perform' a work means to recite, render, play,
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or pro-
cess. . . .- For example, when one receives a broadcast, one is
technically performing. Hence, if a person turns on a radio receiver
in the home, the person is "performing" and, thus, infringing on
the author's right to protection of his or her work. This person is
protected, however, because he is in the privacy of his home.
When a retail store plays a radio station for the pleasure of its
customers, is its broadcasting of, and, thus, performing the works
broadcasted by a local station, subject to an infringement action?
This question cannot be simply answered. More appropriately, the
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
2. This inherent conflict was noted by the Register of Copyrights in his 1961 Report
before Congress: "Although the primary purpose of the copyright law is to foster creation
and dissemination of intellectual work for the public welfare, it also has an important sec-
ondary purpose: To give authors the reward due them for their contribution to society."
Register of Copyrights, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision, Report on the Gen-
eral Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 5 (House Judiciary Comm. Print 1961).
3. See infra note 62.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
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answer is: it depends. This comment will examine section 110(5) of
the 1976 Act which addresses this issue and the legislation and
case law which preceded it.
The statutory exemption to performance provides that the fol-
lowing does not constitute an infringement:
communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a
work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving appa-
ratus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless -
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the
public.5
This section appears to be straightforward. Upon closer examina-
tion, it becomes apparent that the section may be troublesome in
today's age of technological advancement. What constitutes a re-
ceiver normally found "in private homes?" Did Congress intend
that technological advances be considered? Like most people who
consider listening to the radio to be a public right, storeowners
may not be aware that the difference between protection and lia-
bility may be a radio receiver with four speakers as opposed to one
with six. Thus, how viable is this section? Is the concept, to receive
a broadcast is to perform, a proper one? If it is accepted that the
airwaves can be subject to private ownership and control at every
level, that every time a radio is tuned in, one may be subject to
infringement, there will be a lack of practical guidelines and the
composing artist's interest will be unduly advanced at the expense
of the public interest.
II. PRE-1909 AND THE 1909 ACT
In order to properly understand the precedent upon which sec-
tion 110(5) evolved, an historical overview of copyright law and
specifically the development of radio performance under it is nec-
essary.6 The concern for protecting and promoting artistic endeav-
ors was early evidenced by legislation in both England7 and the
Colonies, and, in 1789, the founding fathers empowered Congress
"[t]o promote the progress of science and useful Arts, by securing
5. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1976).
6. See generally A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAw-HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED
AND THE 1976 ACT, 2-14 (5th ed. 1979) (providing an historical review of the development of
copyright law) [hereinafter cited as LATMAN].
7.1 Id. at 3. In England, the Statute of Anne, 8 Anne c. 19, 1710, was the first statute to
acknowledge the rights of artists. Id.
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for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."' The copyright acts of
this country have been guided by this constitutional mandate.
Although there existed four general copyright acts prior to 1909,1
the Copyright Act of 190910 was the guiding legislation until the
1978 enactment of the present Copyright Act of 1976.11 Because
the radio was not yet in existence in 1909, there was no section
analogous to today's section 110(5).12 Nevertheless, with the ad-
vent of radio, issues concerning performance with respect to radio
broadcasting arose. Thus, in 1925, the Sixth Circuit, in Jerome H.
Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co.,13 affirma-
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973)
(the terms of clause eight are not to be narrowly construed, but are to be interpreted "with
the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principles"); Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Con-
gress to grant . . . copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors").
9. These Acts of 1790, 1831, 1870, and the Revised Statutes afforded protection to the
artist for a specific number of years. Although the first Act only protected an author's map,
chart, or book, the later legislation enlarged the property subject to protection, including
such other artistic endeavors as painting and dramatic and musical compositions. See gener-
ally Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 n.17 (1973); LATMAN, supra note 6, at 7; Sol-
berg, Copyright Reform, 35 YALE L.J. 48 (1925).
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (repealed 1978). Legislative history reveals the purpose of the
1909 Act:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitu-
tion is not based on any natural right that the author has in his writings, for the
Supreme Court has held that such rights as he has are purely statutory rights, but
upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science
and useful arts will be promoted.. . . Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but
primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are given. Not that any particular
class of citizens, however worthy, may benefit, but because the policy is believed to be
for the benefit of the great body of people, in that it will stimulate writing and inven-
tion to give some bonus to authors and inventors.
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions: First, how
much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and sec-
ond, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting
of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit
upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
12. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968)
(addressing the issue of statutory interpretation of the 1909 Act, the Court acknowledged
that "this is a statute that was drafted long before the development of the electronic phe-
nomena with which we deal here").
13. 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 556 (1925). In Remick, defendant man-
ufacturing corporation operated a radio station for advertising purposes and had tuned in
plaintiff's copyrighted composition. Bringing a bill in equity, plaintiff averred that defen-
dant's actions constituted a public performance for profit.
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tively decided the issue of whether the broadcasting of a copy-
righted musical work over the radio constituted infringement."
Finding the plaintiff protected under section 1(e) which afforded
the performer with "the exclusive right. . . [t]o perform the copy-
righted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition; and
for the purpose of public performance for profit, 1 5 the court deter-
mined that the broadcasts were intended to"6 stimulate defen-
dant's radio products sales and, hence, constituted a public per-
formance for profit.
In the following year, the Southern District of New York in Je-
rome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 17 found liability on
the part of the broadcaster for having transmitted copyrighted
works to the public. In its discussion, the court asked, "[clertainly
those who listen do not perform, and therefore do not infringe. Can
it be said with any greater reason that one who enables others to
hear participates in the unauthorized performance, so to be a con-
tributory infringer?"18 Responding to its own question, the court
set forth two hypothetical situations: in the first, a person inside a
building tuned in a radio and left a window open, thus enabling
individuals outside of the building to hear the music. This person
was not considered an infringer. In the second situation, a person
who was "equipped with instruments animated by electricity con-
stantly furnished" and who tuned in the instrument was an active
participant in transmitting the protected works and was, thus, a
performer-infringer under the court's interpretation of the Act.' 9
Borrowing the two scenarios posed by the New York court, the
court in Buck v. Debaum ° arrived at a different conclusion.
14. Id. The court acknowledged that although there was no specific section addressing
the issue, "the statute may be applied to new situations not anticipated by Congress, if...
such situations come within its intent and meaning." Id. at 411.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (repealed 1978).
16. Later cases made it clear that one need not intend to infringe in order to be liable
for infringement. See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191" 198 (1931); Pye v.
Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1978); County of Ventura v. Blackburn, 362 F.2d 515,
518 (9th Cir. 1966).
17. 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). The issue before the court was whether "one who by
means of the microphone 'picks up' another's unauthorized performance of a copyrighted
musical composition and transmits it by radio from a broadcasting station maintained and




20. 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929). In Debaum, the plaintiff, president of the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), see infra note 23, asserted that
defendant's broadcasting of a radio station in defendant's cafe for the pleasure of its patrons
672 Vol. 22:669
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Resolving that the act of tuning in a radio was, in fact, analogous
to opening a window in the sense that neither constituted perform-
ance, the Debaum court reasoned that a radio station's transmis-
sion of copyrighted works to the public is a performance, while the
simultaneous receipt of compositions which "are omnipresent in
the air" is not a performance.' Indeed, the court stated that when
a copyright owner licenses a station to play its works, it impliedly
consents to the free transmission of the compositions from the li-
censed station to whomever intercepts the airwaves.
The precedential value of the Debaum decision was undermined
when the case upon which the Debaum court had based its deci-
sion was reversed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court
in 1931. In Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.," the American So-
ciety of Composers, Authors, and Publishers 23 alleged that a hotel's
use of a radio receiving set to transmit broadcasts to its guests via
speakers which had been placed in public and private rooms con-
stituted a public performance for profit.' 4 Writing for the majority,
Justice Brandeis reasoned that when one tunes in a radio station,
inaudible sound waves are converted into audible frequencies,
causing a reproduction and, hence, a performance to occur.'5 Con-
cluding that performance was present, the Court stated that the
existence of a for profit motive did not have to be determined.'
Noteworthy is that the Court's seemingly clear decision was
weakened by its dicta. In a footnote, the Court commented that
had the broadcasted radio station been licensed to transmit the
artist's work,'7 "a license for its commercial reception and distribu-
constituted public performance for profit under section 1(e).
21. 40 F.2d at 735. Specifically, the court reasoned that "[olne who manually or by
human agency merely actuates electrical instrumentalities, whereby inaudible elements that
are omnipresent in the air are made audible to persons who are within hearing, does not
'perform' within the meaning of the Copyright Law." Id.
22. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
23. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), a perform-
ance rights society, was founded in 1914 and is comprised of lyricists, composers and music
publishers. ASCAP sublicenses to those wishing to publicly perform for profit copyrighted
works of ASCAP members. When unlicensed performances are discovered, ASCAP often
institutes actions to enforce its members' rights. Another major performance rights society
is Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). E. KINTrsR & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
PRIMER 410-12 (2d ed. 1982).
24. Suit was also brought against the radio station for its broadcasting of a copy-
righted song for which it had not paid licensing fees. 283 U.S. at 195 n.1.
25. Id. at 200.
26. Id. at 202. Justice Brandeis wrote, "[b]ut whether there was a performance does
not depend upon the existence of the profit motive." Id.
27. See supra note 24.
1984
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tion by the hotel company might possibly have been implied." 8
This statement seemed to imply that if a later court was presented
with a Jewell-LaSalle issue, it might inquire whether the broad-
casted station was or was not licensed; if the station tuned in was a
licensed one, liability would be avoided, while if an unlicensed sta-
tion was tuned in, liability would result. The Supreme Court dis-
tinction was clearly questioned" and later cases seemed to ignore
the suggested distinction between licensed and unlicensed broad-
casting stations.3 0
The Jewell-LaSalle decision remained the controlling precedent
for greater than thirty-five years, during which time "it was as-
sumed that all business establishments required a license from the
copyright owner before they could legally pick up broadcasts off
the air and retransmit them to their customers and guests." 3' This
rigid policy was disturbed in 1968 when the Supreme Court, in
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,32 again ad-
dressed the issue of performance and found that performance was
absent. Referring to its decision in Jewell-LaSalie, the Supreme
Court stated that the Court's prior holding was "a questionable 35-
year old decision that in actual practice has not been applied
outside its own factual context."33
In Fortnightly, the petitioner operated a cable television system
28. 283 U.S. at 199 n.5.
29. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (For-
tas, J., dissenting). Therein, Justice Fortas stated that "the interpretation of the term 'per-
form' cannot logically turn on the question whether the material that is used is licensed or
not licensed." Id. at 406 n.5. See also 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18[A], at 8-
186 n.10 (1983), wherein the author wrote:
[T]he two major performing right societies, ASCAP and BMI, do not choose to en-
force the Jewell-LaSalle doctrine to its logical extreme in that they do not demand
performing licenses from commercial establishments such as bars and restaurants
which operate radio or television sets for the amusement of their customers. . . .[al-
though] such demands are made of hotels which operate in the manner of the LaSalle
Hotel.
Id.
30. See Society of European State Authors and Composers v. New York Hotel Statler
Co., 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (hotel's transmitting of copyrighted works from a li-
censed radio station via a master receiving set to guests' rooms constituted infringement).
See also Note, The Meaning of "Performance" Under the Copyright Act, 7 U. TOL. L. REv.
705, 713 (1976) ("[iut is apparent, [despite the Jewell-LaSalle footnote] that the rule estab-
lished in Jewell-LaSalle was interpreted by the courts to embrace both licensed and unli-
censed broadcasts").
31. N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 5.25, at 168 (1981),
32. 392 U.S. 390 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 902 (1967).
33. Id. at 401 n.30. As noted above, Jewell-LaSalle was applied outside its factual
situation, see supra note 30.
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(CATV), 4 whereby it received, by way of antennae, television pro-
grams from five television stations. The programs were converted
and transmitted to subscribers via cables."s The respondent, 6 in
instituting its copyright infringement action against the petitioner,
alleged that petitioner's transmission of the television programs
constituted unauthorized performance for profit under the 1909
Act.3
7
Although the case concerned the medium of television and not
radio, the issue of performance was the central issue addressed by
the Court. Discussing the interplay between those who broadcast a
television program and those who view it, Justice Stewart found
that "[blroadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform."3 He rea-
soned that while a television viewer furnished the means by which
electronic signals were converted into visible images and audible
sounds, the viewer was merely a "passive beneficiary" of the sig-
nals that abounded.3 9 Essentially, the Court placed the CATV sys-
tem "on the viewer's side of the line,"'40 finding that the CATV
equipment was similar to that provided by the viewer in the sense
that it facilitated a viewer's ability to receive the broadcaster's sig-
nals and that the system was not a broadcaster.4 1 Thus, the impact
of the Fortnightly decision was that while the television station
was a performer under the Act, one who enhanced receipt of the
34. For a discussion of the CATV systems, see United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161 (1967) ("CATV systems receive the signals of television broadcasting
stations, amplify them, transmit them by cable or microwave, and ultimately distribute
them by wire to the receivers of their subscribers").
35. 392 U.S. 390 at 392. The subscribers paid a flat monthly rate and were able to
choose among five stations by turning the knobs on their television sets. Id. at 392-93.
36. The respondent, United Artists Television, Inc., held copyrights to several motion
pictures. Id. at 393.
37. Id. Respondent asserted protection under sections 1(c) and (d) which provided in
pertinent part:
Sec. 1 Exclusive Rights as to Copyrighted Works
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall
have the exclusive right...
(c) To deliver. . . nondramatic literary work;. and to play or perform it in
public for profit, and to exhibit, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any
manner or by any method whatsoever. ...
(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama...
17 U.S.C. § 1(c)-(d) (repealed 1978).
38. 392 U.S. at 398 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 399.
40. Id. (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 400. The Court concluded "[w]ith due regard to changing technology, we
hold that the petitioner did not under [the] law 'perform' the respondent's copyrighted
works." Id. at 402.
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airwaves by use of a receiving set, whether the individual was the
ultimate viewer or one who enhanced the transmission of airwaves
to the ultimate viewer, was merely a recipient and not subject to
copyright liability.
Six years later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Tele-
prompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc."2 in order
to resolve a similar allegation of copyright infringement against the
CATV system. 4 The petitioners in Teleprompter argued that de-
velopments in the CATV system since the Fortnightly decision ne-
cessitated a finding of performance for profit." Disagreeing with
this stance, the majority applied a functionality approach used in
Fortnightly,45 stating that the advancements made in the system,
such as its ability to transmit to more distant locations, 4 did not
transform the CATV system into the status of broadcaster-
performer.47
42. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
43. See supra note 34.
44. 415 U.S. at 403-04. The three developments were: program origination on the part
of the system; commercials being sold by CATV operators; and interconnection between
different CATV systems. Id.
45. The Fortnightly Court evaluated that the issue of CATV liability was to be deter-
mined by the "function that CATV play[ed] in the total process of television broadcasting
and reception." 392 U.S. at 397. Noteworthy is that the application of this "function" test to
the facts in Teleprompter has been criticized. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 8.18[A], at 8-
191 (1983) ("[g]iven this distinction [between the broadcaster and viewer functions], the
Teleprompter Court's conclusion that the complex and costly technology involved in im-
porting signals still falls on the viewer side of the line seems to this writer unrealistic and
overly restrictive"). See also Oannay, An Overview of Teleprompter v. CBS and Other Re-
cent Developments-Ominous Signals for Copyright Law, 22 COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE USA
10 (1974-1975), where the author wrote:[The Teleprompter] court was concerned only with
the vague "functional" test of the meaning of the term "perform"-not with the economic
impact of distant signal importation. This judicial methodology produces a kind of tunnel
vision. First, rights and liabilities arising out of the use of today's sophisticated technology
(such as cable television) obviously involve immensely important, previously undecided, and
complex and difficult questions of economic and public policy. Second, these questions can-
not be controlled or resolved satisfactorily by judicial interpretation of vague and ambigu-
ous words-such as "perform"-plucked from a copyright statute enacted more than half a
century ago, when the particular technology in issue was not conceived or conceivable.
Id. at 14.
46. In Fortnightly, the system picked up local signals only. 392 U.S. at 391-92.
47. 415 U.S. at 409-10. The court reasoned:By importing signals that could not nor-
mally be received with current technology in the community it serves, a CATV system does
not, for copyright purposes, alter the function it performs for its subscribers. When a televi-
sion broadcaster transmits a program, it has made public for simultaneous viewing and
hearing the contents of that program. The privilege of receiving the broadcast electronic
signals and of converting them into the sights and sounds of the program inheres in all
members of the public who have the means of doing so. The reception and rechanneling of
these signals for simultaneous viewing is essentially a viewer function, irrespective of the
676
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The issue of performance was again squarely addressed by the
Supreme Court in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken.48 In
Aiken, the respondent owner and operator of a fast food store,'4 9
equipped his shop with a radio which was connected to four speak-
ers located in the ceiling. Each day Aiken tuned in a radio station
and broadcastings were heard by him, his customers, and his em-
ployees. On March 11, 1972, the radio station which respondent
had tuned in, broadcasted two copyrighted musical pieces owned
by petitioners.50 Although the radio station was licensed to broad-
cast, respondent had not obtained a license, and in petitioner's suit
it averred that the radio reception constituted an infringement on
petitioner's exclusive right to "perform" the protected composi-
tions.5' The Court acknowledged that the central issue for disposi-
tion was whether respondent's radio reception constituted a per-
formance. Limiting Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co."2 to its
factual situation,53 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Fortnightly5
and Teleprompter"5 decisions and held that respondent's actions
did not constitute performance. 5 To hold otherwise, the Court
stated, "would result in a regime of copyright law that would be
wholly unenforceable and highly inequitable. '57 It was against this
background that the issue of "performance" was addressed by
Congress in fashioning the present copyright legislation.
distance between the broadcasting station and the ultimate viewer.
Id. at 408.
48. 422 U.S. 151 (1975). Aiken is noted at 14 DuQ. L. REv. 739 (1976).
49. Customers were invited to either take out the food they purchased or eat it in the
store. 422 U.S. at 152.
50. Id. at 152-53.
51. Id.
52. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
53. The Court was referring to the fact that the radio station in Jewell-LaSalle was
not licensed to broadcast the copyrighted works. See supra note 24.
54. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
56. 422 U.S. at 160-61. The majority approvingly quoted the rationale of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit: "[I]f Fortnightly, with its elaborate CATV plant and Tele-
prompter with its even more sophisticated and extended technological and programming
facilities were not 'performing,' then logic dictates that no 'performance' resulted when the
[respondent) merely activated his restaurant radio." Id. at 161-62 (quoting Twentieth Cen-
tury Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127, 137 (3d. Cir. 1974)).
57. Id. at 162.
1984
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III. THE 1976 ACT
A. Legislative History
Acknowledging the need to update the statutory law, in 1976
congressional members wrote, "[s]ince [1909] significant changes in
technology have affected the operation of the copyright law." 58
Specifically required was a section which would provide guidelines
with respect to radio performance and which would address the
dilemma presented in Aiken.5 9 Under the format of the new Act,60
the meaning of "perform" is set forth in the Act's definitional sec-
tion6 and exemptions to a copyright owner's exclusive rights" are
separately indicated in section 110.68
Scrutiny of the legislative history behind section 110(5) indicates
that the section is intended to apply to "performances and displays
of all types of works, and its purpose is to exempt from copyright
liability anyone who merely turns on, in a public place, an ordinary
radio or television receiving apparatus of a kind commonly sold to
members of the public for private use."" Both the Senate"6 and
58. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976).
59. See infra notes 65, 68. See also LATMAN, supra note 6, at 189 ("[t]he Aiken prob-
lem was addressed in the exemption found in § 110(5), but the result is far from clear").
60. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
61. See supra text accompanying note 4.
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) which enumerates the exclusive rights granted a copy-
right owner. Section 106 provides in pertinent part:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works ... , to
perform the copyrighted works publicly...
Id.
63. It is noteworthy that under the 1909 Act, a copyright owner's exclusive rights to
public performance extended to use of the works "for profit," 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (repealed
1978), while under the 1976 Act this "for profit" requirement was replaced by the specific
exemptions found in 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1976). See generally, Korman, Performance Rights In
Music Under Sections 110 and 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 521
(1977).
64. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 86 (1976). The House Report indicated
that turning on a radio receiver in public is an act "so remote and minimal" that liability is
not justified and that such an exemption "should be made explicit in the statute." Id.
65. See 122 Cong. Rec. S1564 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1976): "[T]his exemption would not
apply where broadcasts are transmitted by means of loudspeakers or similar devices in such
establishments as bus terminals, supermarkets, factories, and commercial offices, depart-
ment and clothing stores, hotels, restaurants and quick-service shops of the type involved in
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken." Id. See also Brennan, Legislative History and
Chapter 1 of S.22, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 193, 202 (1976) (commenting on the above Senate
statement, the author wrote, "[i]t is the specific intent of the Senate to reverse the Supreme
Court holding in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken . . ." (footnote omitted)).
678
1984 Performance Exemption
House66 specifically referred to the Aiken holding in their discus-
sions, the House Report stating that the factual circumstances sur-
rounding Aiken "represent the outer limit of the exemption and
. . . that the line should be drawn at that point. '67 Although both
branches of Congress generally agreed upon the content of the sec-
tion, a Conference Committee, comprised of members of both
branches, met to agree upon its scope' s and the present section
110(5) resulted."'
B. Case Law
Since the Act's promulgation, few cases have arisen under sec-
tion 110(5).70 In 1981, in Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc.,71 mem-
66. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87 (1976).
67. Id. at 87. Continuing, the House Committee wrote:
[T]he clause would exempt small commercial establishments whose proprietors
merely bring onto their premises standard radio or television equipment and turn it
on for their customer's enjoyment but it would impose liability where the proprietor
has a commercial "sound system" installed or converts a standard home receiving
apparatus (by augmenting it with sophisticated or extensive amplification equipment)
into the equivalent of a commercial sound system. Factors to consider in particular
cases would include the size, physical arrangement, and noise level of the areas within
the establishment where the transmissions made audible or visible, and the extent to
which the receiving apparatus is altered or augmented for the purpose of improving
the aural or visual quality of the performance for individual members of the public
using those areas.
Id.
68. See CONF. REP. No. 1773, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976). The Conference Commit-
tee stated:
It is the intent of the conferees that a small commercial establishment of the type
involved in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975), which
merely augmented a home-type receiver and which was not of sufficient size to jus-
tify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a commercial background music service,
would be exempt. However, where the public communication was by means of some-
thing other than a home-type receiving apparatus, or where the establishment actu-
ally makes a further transmission to the public, the exemption would not apply.
Id. The background music service about which the conferees spoke, was in reference to
pending litigation between ASCAP and a member of the background music industry, Mu-
zak; the latter being concerned that potential subscribers to its service were instead opting
to use radio station broadcasting. See Korman, supra note 63, at 533.
For comment on the Conference Committee's Report, see LATMAN, supra note 6, at 193
("it remains to be seen, after this tortious history, how the conference report language will
be construed"); NIMMER, supra note 29, § 8.18 [C], at 8-204 (the Conference Committee
Report "adds an unfortunate further element of vagueness which renders application of sec-
tion 110(5) quite speculative").
69. See supra text accompanying note 5.
70. See Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923, 924 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 668
F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982) ("[t]he reach of these provisions of
section 110(5) has scarcely been tested in the courts.").
71. Id.
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bers of ASCAP brought action against the Gap Stores, Inc., a retail
clothing store establishment, alleging that the actions of two of its
chain stores of transmitting radio programs to its customers by
way of a radio receiver connected to recessed loudspeakers 72 con-
stituted infringement. Presented with the issue of whether the de-
fendant was exempt from liability under section 110(5), the court
applied the pertinent legislative history to the facts and deter-
mined that the exemption was not applicable. Specifically, the
court reasoned that the physical size of the Gap Stores was large
enough to warrant subscription to a commercial background music
service.73 In addition, the type of receivers used by the establish-
ments74 necessitated a finding of copyright infringement. In af-
firming the district court, the Second Circuit 75 also found the phys-
ical size of the stores to be a compelling factor 76 in its decision that
the establishments exceeded the "outer limit" of protection af-
forded in section 110(5)."
The only other case to date addressing whether a section 110(5)
exemption was operable is Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States
Shoe Corp.78 Therein, Broadcast Music, Inc. [BMI]79 alleged that
the women's retail apparel store, Casual Corner, infringed under
the Copyright Act by broadcasting radio stations over its four or
72. One of the stores was equipped with four speakers, while the other store had seven
speakers. Id. at 924.
73. Id. at 925. The court noted that one store was 2769 square feet and the other was
6770 square feet, of which 4690 square feet was selling space open to the public. Id. at 924.
The court compared this to the restaurant in Aiken which was 1055 square feet with a 620
square foot commercial area available to the public. Id.
74. Both parties presented experts to testify whether the components were those
"commonly used in private homes," as required under section 110(5). Id. at 925. The court
resolved that "the stereo apparatus used by the specified Gap Stores, including built-in wir-
ing and four or seven loudspeakers recessed in ceiling cavities, may be considered to be
'standard home receiving apparatus [converted] (by augmenting it with sophisticated or ex-
tensive amplification equipment) into the equivalent of a commercial sound system.'" Id. at
925 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976)).
75. 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981).
76. Id. at 86. Finding that the size of the store justified a subscription to a commercial
background service as outlined in the Conference Report, see supra note 68, the Second
Circuit also wrote that the Gap Store "is much larger than the shop in Aiken which, as
Judge Gagliardi concluded, indicates that Congress did not intend it to be exempted from
the mandates of the copyright laws pursuant to § 110(5)." 668 F.2d at 86.
77. See supra text accompanying note 67.
78. 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982).
79. BMI, like ASCAP, is a performance rights society which was a licensor of numer-
ous songs which had been broadcast at Casual Corner. See supra note 23 for a brief descrip-
tion of performance rights societies.
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more speakers which were connected to a single radio receiver.80 In
a brief opinion affirming the lower court's grant of summary judg-
ment, the Ninth Circuit found that Casual Corner was not within
the contemplation of the narrow infringement exemption."1 Fur-
thermore, the court disagreed with appellant's contention that the
section's wording, "commonly used in private homes,"8 " was void
for vagueness, stating "[w]e believe that a person of ordinary intel-
ligence can understand and apply the requirements of the Act."83
IV. CONCLUSION
It is important to note that merely because few cases exist inter-
preting section 110(5), this lack of litigation does not necessarily
indicate that the section is a viable one. Indeed, when faced with
the choice of the high cost of litigation as opposed to paying licens-
ing fees" to tune in a radio station, a commercial establishment
may understandably find it economically feasible to pay the fee.
This, however, does not resolve the suggested premise that sec-
tion 110(5) is not a viable part of the copyright legislation. Bearing
in mind the inherent tension created in a field of law in which two
opposite interests are sought to be protected - that is the freedom
of public access to artistic endeavors and the reward afforded to
the author, composer, or publisher -- section 110(5) promotes the
latter at the expense of the former.
The initial premise that the airwaves are the property of private
individuals"' as opposed to the public permits disparate treatment
among recipients of radio broadcasts and, thus, the public in gen-
eral is injured. Is it logical to permit a small commercial establish-
ment which uses a home receiver "with four ordinary loudspeakers
80. 678 F.2d at 817.
81. The court held, "Casual Corner exceeds this limit because each store has a com-
mercial monaural system, with widely separated speakers of a type not commonly used in
private homes, and the size and nature of the operation justifies the use of a commercial
background music system." Id.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1976).
83. 678 F.2d at 817.
84. The current annual licensing fees charged by ASCAP with respect to a radio
broadcast in any type of commercial establishment which does not serve food or drink are:
one hundred dollars for the first one, two or three speakers and twenty dollars per addi-
tional speaker after three. (Figures collected from a current rate schedule issued by
ASCAP.) It may be noted that these fees are likely to be tax deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses under 26 U.S.C. § 162 (1976).




grouped within a relatively narrow circumference from the set" 6 to
be exempt from liability under section 110(5), as the House Report
condoned, while a store which places six speakers not so closely to
the set may be subject to liability? Such confusing distinctions
would not be necessary if it were accepted that the airwaves are in
the public domain and once a radio station has paid its licensing
fees to broadcast the protected works and the works are transmit-
ted over the airwaves, any member of the public may freely tune in
the broadcasted works. This suggestion merely redraws the line as
to how far the copyright owner's monopoly may reach, and in-
creases the public interest in benefitting from the artistic works.8 7
Application of the section is rendered more questionable when it
is viewed in light of our current technological age. It is clear that
technological advancements are continually occurring and, as Con-
gress acknowledged, "technology promises even greater changes in
the near future."88 Is it, therefore, practical to set forth legislation
which requires - or should require - that its guidelines be con-
tinually subject to change given rapidly advancing technology?
Furthermore, is it logical to continually apply the factual circum-
stances found in Aiken"9 - a 1975 case - as being the outermost
limitation to section 110(5) application, as the legislative history so
provides?9" Certainly what is determined to be beyond the scope of
a receiver commonly found in a home today may clearly be found
in a home tomorrow, if not considered obsolete in a homeowner's
eyes a year from now. It is, therefore, clear that section 110(5) pro-
motes confusing distinctions to the shopkeeper who must decide
whether or not he or she is within the parameters of the
exemption.
86. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976).
87. It has been noted that radio broadcasts of copyrighted works afford the artist with
a free form of advertising and, thus, rewards to the author for his or her efforts are in-
creased in terms of potential record sales. (This is in addition to amounts received in the
form of licensing fees from the commercial establishment.) See, Comment, Music and the
Courts: Copyrights, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 331 (1975):
The extended audience actually has an added benefit for the copyright holder whose
compositions are played on the radio. While providing a common source of entertain-
ment, the radio additionally acts as a free advertisement for a more lucrative form of
royalties and copyright benefits-record sales. Out of five hundred people surveyed,
only two could recall recordings they had purchased which they had not first heard
on the radio.
Id. at 338 (footnote omitted).
88. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976).
89. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
90. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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An equitable balance with respect to the above-mentioned inter-
ests sought to be protected in copyright law is also absent. The
logical alternative is to shift the emphasis away from who receives
the broadcast and the type of set by which the transmission is re-
ceived and to focus attention upon the sender. The parties from
whom royalties are received should stop with the radio station and
should not extend to the recipient who merely tunes in a desired
station. In this way, the law will be clear. The public interest will
be promoted, and the copyright holder will still be protected.
Julie Alexa Strauss

